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Rule	Set Random	Schools Location	Constraints School	Value-Added
1 No Yes Yes
2 No No Yes
3 Yes Yes Yes
4 Yes No Yes
5 No Yes No
6 No No No
7 Yes Yes No














































Rule GCSE-5+	vs	A:P GCSE-5+	vs	MaxDist A:P	vs	MaxDist Moran's	I
Set m r2 p m r2 p m r2 p Stat. p
1 7.89 0.96 0.00 -0.78 0.70 5.58 -0.09 0.65 10.00 0.92 0.00
2 6.88 0.85 0.68 -0.18 0.38 47.20 -0.02 0.36 50.92 0.01 32.50
3 8.53 0.94 0.12 -0.41 0.23 70.16 -0.04 0.20 71.16 0.91 0.00
4 6.51 0.76 4.84 -0.01 0.13 74.68 0.00 0.14 74.44 0.01 31.50
5 6.98 0.97 0.00 -0.67 0.68 8.60 -0.09 0.65 10.96 0.92 0.00
6 1.79 0.30 56.68 0.00 0.12 76.16 0.00 0.11 76.88 0.01 46.00
7 7.36 0.92 2.60 -0.26 0.18 71.92 -0.03 0.16 74.96 0.91 0.00
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Parm GCSE-5+	vs	A:P GCSE-5+	vs	MaxDist A:P	vs	MaxDist Moran's	I
Set m r2 p m r2 p m r2 p Stat. p
1 11.21 0.93 0.00 -0.70 0.65 8.76 -0.06 0.61 12.16 0.93 0.00
2 7.66 0.90 0.00 -0.79 0.69 6.08 -0.09 0.60 12.68 0.91 0.00
3 8.35 0.96 0.00 -0.80 0.71 5.00 -0.09 0.67 8.04 0.92 0.00
4 8.09 0.96 0.00 -0.80 0.70 4.12 -0.09 0.66 7.08 0.92 0.00
5 5.39 0.93 0.04 -0.68 0.59 20.56 -0.11 0.53 25.80 0.92 0.00
6 6.12 0.88 0.40 -0.04 0.13 76.52 0.00 0.11 78.12 0.93 0.00
7 9.67 0.95 0.00 -1.06 0.69 7.60 -0.11 0.67 9.12 0.92 0.00
8 10.69 0.93 0.00 -1.18 0.71 5.64 -0.11 0.69 6.44 0.92 0.00
9 10.80 0.93 0.00 -1.13 0.68 9.60 -0.10 0.66 12.40 0.92 0.00
10 8.11 0.95 0.00 -0.84 0.70 5.52 -0.10 0.65 10.28 0.92 0.00
11 7.39 0.96 0.00 -0.71 0.68 7.76 -0.09 0.63 12.32 0.92 0.00
12 7.37 0.96 0.00 -0.72 0.64 10.16 -0.09 0.60 17.76 0.91 0.00
13 7.16 0.96 0.00 -0.68 0.67 8.28 -0.09 0.63 12.92 0.91 0.00




























































































Rule	Set PE SPE Att=Asp GCSE-5+	vs	A:P GCSE-5+	vs	MaxDist A:P	vs	MaxDist Moran's	I
r2 p r2 p r2 p Stat. p
9 F F T 0.93 0.00 0.60 17.24 0.59 17.68 0.93 0.00
10 F F F 0.90 0.00 0.42 39.52 0.41 43.80 0.92 0.00
11 F T T 0.93 0.00 0.61 17.36 0.61 16.76 0.93 0.00
12 F T F 0.88 0.00 0.44 38.12 0.46 37.36 0.93 0.00
13 T F T 0.95 0.00 0.70 5.52 0.67 8.48 0.92 0.00
14 T F F 0.94 0.00 0.67 11.48 0.64 14.60 0.92 0.00
15 T T F 0.94 0.00 0.68 10.48 0.65 13.88 0.92 0.00
Parent-level	patterns
5.6 Our	generative	approach	to	modelling	has	shown	that	the	consequences	of	our	assumptions	about	the	system	at	the	individual,
parent,	level	can	generate	the	empirically	observed	relationships	and	patterns	at	the	higher,	school,	level.	Although	this	model	is
a	highly	simplified	conceptualisation,	it	allows	us	to	examine	relationships	between	entities	at	the	lower	level	and	between	upper
and	lower	levels	that	would	not	be	possible	(or	at	the	least,	very	difficult)	in	the	real	world.	For	example,	our	parent-level	results
(for	Rule	Set	1,	Table	3)	show	that	in	general	those	in	the	second	distance	class	(distance	10–20)	achieve	greatest	 child-
attainment	increases,	and	not	those	in	the	closest	distance	class	(distance	<	10,	Figure	4a).	This	is	because	those	parents	that
live	in	the	closest	distance	class	have	on	average	greater	aspiration	than	those	in	the	second	distance	class	and	therefore	have
greatest	child-attainment	initially.	Consequently,	the	child-attainment	of	these	closest	parents	is	on	average	more	likely	to
decrease	than	increase.
5.7 Another	interesting	finding	from	our	parent-level	analysis	is	that	those	parents	with	aspiration	60–70	fail	to	get	their	child	into	their
preferred	school	more	often	than	other	parents	(closely	followed	by	those	with	aspiration	50–60,	Figure	4c).	As	noted	in	the
results,	the	likelihood	of	failing	to	get	into	a	preferred	school	using	strategy	3	(rank	schools	considered	satisfactory	by	distance
ascending,	then	all	other	schools	by	distance	ascending,	Table	2)	increases	as	aspiration	increases	(Figure	4c).	Although	a
greater	proportion	of	parents	with	aspiration	70–80	fail	when	using	strategy	3	compared	to	parents	with	aspiration	60–70,	parents
in	this	lower	aspiration	class	have	a	greater	proportion	of	parents	using	this	strategy	overall	(parents	with	higher	aspiration	are
more	likely	to	be	in	a	school	catchment	and	therefore	use	strategies	5–8).	Parents	with	aspiration	60–70	are	no	less	likely	to	find
themselves	outside	a	school	catchment	than	parents	with	lower	aspiration	(Figure	4c)	but	because	their	aspiration	is	higher	they
consider	only	better	schools	satisfactory	for	their	child.	This	means	they	have	fewer	schools	to	rank	(so	distance	to	those	schools
is	likely	to	be	greater),	and	each	of	those	schools	is	more	likely	to	have	greater	numbers	of	parents	deeming	them	satisfactory	to
send	their	child	to	(and	so	these	schools	have	many	parents	ranking	them	as	most	preferred).	In	contrast,	parents	with	lower
aspiration	(e.g.,	aspiration	<	50)	are	more	likely	to	get	into	their	preferred	school	even	though	not	in	any	school's	catchment,	both
because	the	distance	to	the	nearest	school	is	likely	to	be	smaller	(because	there	are	more	schools	deemed	satisfactory)	and
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because	there	are	fewer	other	applicants	ranking	that	school	as	most	preferred	(because	other	parents	are	more	likely	to	avoid
it).	The	failure	of	parents	with	aspiration	60–70	to	get	into	their	preferred	(i.e.,	top	ranked)	school	is	reflected	in	their	greater
allocation	distances	than	any	other	aspiration	class	(Figure	4b).	Furthermore,	only	approximately	3%	of	parents	with	aspiration
60–70	move,	and	many	remain	stuck	in	the	position	of	having	higher	than	average	aspiration	but	not	being	'in	the	right	place'
(spatially)	when	they	initially	arrive	in	the	model	environment	(because	of	location	constraints).	These	parents	have	aspirations
'too	high'	relative	to	their	ability	to	move	into	preferred	school	catchments.
5.8 The	question	then	arises;	how	might	school	allocation	rules	or	policies	be	modified	to	help	those	parents	with	above	average,	but
not	very	high,	aspiration	(and	therefore	mobility)	get	into	better	schools	(or	at	least	schools	they	want)?	One	way	might	be	to
increase	the	standards	of	schools	so	that	a	greater	number	meet	the	aspirations	of	parents.	In	so	doing,	the	number	of	schools
that	parents	with	above	average	but	not	very	high	aspiration	deem	satisfactory	to	send	their	child	to	will	increase	and	the	danger
of	not	being	in	a	school	catchment	should	decrease.	To	investigate	this	we	examine	a	scenario	in	which	we	run	the	model	as	for
Rule	Set	1	(Table	3)	but	with	a	greater	mean	school	value-added	of	0.2	(although	with	the	same	standard	deviation	as	previously
of	0.1).	Results	for	this	'improved	school	standards'	scenario	indicate	that	increased	ability	of	schools	to	raise	child-attainment
produces	changes	in	strategies	for	parents	with	higher	aspiration	and	decreases	the	proportion	of	parents	with	aspiration	60–70
that	fail	to	get	their	child	into	their	preferred	school	(Figure	6,	compare	to	Figure	4c).	Furthermore,	this	increase	in	mean	school
value-added	increases	the	proportions	of	parents	in	other	aspiration	classes	that	fail	to	get	their	child	into	a	preferred	school,
resulting	in	a	more	even	distribution	of	failure	across	the	aspiration	classes.
Figure	6.	Relationship	between	aspiration	and	strategy	at	parent-level	for	'improved	school	standards'	scenario.
Prospects	for	future	work
5.9 The	'improved	school	standards'	scenario	is	just	one	example	of	the	kinds	of	scenarios	we	can	examine	with	the	model.	The
model	could	also	be	used	to	explore	alternative	school	allocation	rules	and	policies,	which	might	include	random	lotteries	for
school	allocation	(e.g.,	Allen	et	al.	2013),	opening	'free'	schools	that	may	use	aptitude	as	a	selection	criterion	(e.g.,	Hatcher	2011),
or	the	closure	of	under-performing	schools.	Future	changes	to	the	model	might	extend	it	to	enable	representation	of	other	criteria
used	in	UK	state	school	allocation	(e.g.,	religious	faith,	attendance	of	siblings).
5.10 The	model	presented	here	uses	only	a	single	parent	agent	variable	(aspiration	for	high	educational	attainment)	to	simultaneously
represent	the	goals	of	parents	and	the	constraints	on	their	ability	to	meet	those	goals.	However,	there	are	many	factors	underlying
where	families	want	and/or	are	able	to	live	and	which	schools	they	perceive	as	desirable	for	their	child	to	attend.	For	example,
educational	aspiration	varies	by	class	and	ethnicity	(Butler	and	Hamnett	2011,	2012)	and	the	ability	to	move	house	to	achieve
these	aspirations	is	an	economic	question	influenced	by	the	housing	market.	The	representation	of	agents	and	their	environment
with	multiple	attributes	that	more	accurately	reflect	motivations	and	constraints	is	needed.	There	is	no	reason	why	aspiration	for
educational	attainment	and	economic	wealth	should	be	correlated	and	future	modelling	may	explore	how	variations	in
distributions	of	these	factors	result	in	different	winners	and	losers	through	time	and	across	space.	Improving	this	representation
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will	require	individual-level	data	on	attributes,	preferences	and	allocations.	These	improvements	in	representation	and	data	would
also	allow	an	investigation	of	motivations	for	school	choice	beyond	exam	results	alone,	allowing	agents	to	identify	preferences
based	upon	school	ethnic	and	socio-economic	composition	and	the	attributes	of	other	parents	that	send	their	child	to	a	school
(although	that	is	in	some	ways	represented	here	through	the	Att=Asp	assumption).
5.11 What	we	have	been	able	to	show	here	using	a	simple,	abstract	agent-based	model	that	represents	individual	parents	in
disaggregated	manner,	and	which	was	not	immediately	apparent	at	the	outset,	is	how	constraints	on	individuals'	movements,
when	combined	with	distance	allocation	rules,	produce	winners	and	losers	that	are	not	directly	correlated	to	the	individuals'
attributes.	That	is,	it	is	not	agents	with	lowest	aspiration	that	are	least	satisfied	with	their	school	allocation	outcomes,	and	instead
it	is	parent	agents	with	above	average,	but	not	very	high,	aspiration	that	fail	to	get	their	child	into	their	preferred	school	more
frequently	than	other	parents.	Using	disaggregated,	agent-based	simulation	approaches	like	this	allows	investigation	of
individual-level	outcomes	of	system	level	policies.	When	informed	more	directly	by	individual-level	data,	and	used	in	combination
with	scenarios	of	different	education	policies,	this	modelling	approach	will	allow	us	to	more	rigorously	investigate	the
consequences	of	those	policies	for	education	inequalities	across	space	and	through	time.
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	Notes
	1	Other	criteria	such	as	the	attendance	of	siblings	at	a	school	and	special	educational	needs	are	also	considered	but	influence	a
very	minor	proportion	of	all	applicants.
2	Data	from:	Department	for	Education.	Secondary	School	GCSE	Performance	Tables	2010:	Barking	and	Dagenham.	HMSO.
2011.	URL:	http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/performance/archive/schools_10/pdf_10/301.pdf.	Accessed:	2012-10-18.
(Archived	by	WebCite®	at	http://www.webcitation.org/6BVNtJTe9);	Department	for	Education.	Secondary	School	GCSE
Performance	Tables	2011:	Barking	and	Dagenham.	HMSO.	2012.	URL:
http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/performance/2011/download/pdf/301_ks4.pdf.	Accessed:	2012-10-18.	(Archived	by
WebCite®	at	http://www.webcitation.org/6BVNziv1Z);	London	Borough	of	Barking	and	Dagenham.	The	Right	Secondary	School:
Information	for	parents	about	moving	to	secondary	schools	in	2013.	London	Borough	of	Barking	and	Dagenham.	2012.	URL:
http://www.lbbd.gov.uk/Education/Admissions/Documents/RSS2013.pdf.	Accessed:	2012-10-18.	(Archived	by	WebCite®	at
http://www.webcitation.org/6BVOM2pTi);	London	Borough	of	Barking	and	Dagenham.	The	Right	Secondary	School:	Information
for	parents	about	moving	to	secondary	schools	in	2012.	London	Borough	of	Barking	and	Dagenham.	2011.	URL:
http://www.lbbd.gov.uk/Education/Admissions/Documents/RSS2012.pdf.	Accessed:	2012-10-18.	(Archived	by	WebCite®	at
http://www.webcitation.org/6BVOUK84I)
3	http://www.openabm.org/model/3364/version/1/
4	In	real	schools,	pupils	in	year	11	may	be	aged	15	or	16	depending	on	their	birth	date.	However,	the	temporal	resolution	of	the
model	is	one	year	and	child	ages	are	updated	simultaneously	so	we	assume	pupils	are	aged	11	during	school	year	7,	12	during
year	8,	etc.	until	being	age	15	during	year	11.
5	Note	that	ranking	strategies	for	both	moving	and	application	include	situations	in	which	parents	do	not	consider	any	schools
satisfactory	to	send	their	child	to.	In	this	unsatisfactory	situation	in	the	real	world,	parents	may	have	the	means	to	move	to	a
location	outside	their	current	LEA	where	they	think	they	their	child	will	get	a	place	at	a	satisfactory	state	school.	Alternatively,	if
they	have	the	means	they	may	remove	their	child	from	the	state	school	system	and	send	them	into	private	schooling.	Neither	of
these	options	is	represented	by	the	current	model	structure,	which	is	essentially	a	closed	system.
6	In	reality,	school	places	are	allocated	by	the	Local	Education	Authority	(LEA)	and	not	by	individual	schools.	However,	the
school-driven	allocation	procedure	used	in	the	model	here	is	consistent	with	the	logic	used	by	an	LEA	and	does	not	require	the
use	of	ancillary	model	objects	other	than	schools	and	parents.
7	In	the	table	m	is	mean	regression	coefficient	of	a	linear	regression	between	the	two	variables,	p	is	the	mean	number	of
timesteps	in	which	p	>	0.05	for	the	relationship	between	the	variables,	and	r2	is	the	mean	coefficient	of	determination	for	the
linear	regression	model.	All	values	are	for	80	timesteps	in	25	model	replicates.
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8	In	the	table	m	is	mean	regression	coefficient	of	a	linear	regression	between	the	two	variables,	p	is	the	mean	number	of
timesteps	in	which	p	>	0.05	for	the	relationship	between	the	variables,	and	r2	is	the	mean	coefficient	of	determination	for	the
linear	regression	model.	All	values	are	for	80	timesteps	in	25	model	replicates.
9	Note	that	we	present	only	seven	combinations,	as	the	combination	with	all	three	assumptions	true	is	equivalent	to	Rule	Set	1	in
Table	3.
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